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Abstract
In this thesis, we considered the costs and benefits of implementing Positive Passen-
ger Bag Match (PPBM) - an anti-terrorist measure to keep bombs out of checked
luggage - on US domestic passenger flights. We constructed a stochastic model for
comparing the cost-effectiveness of three alternative approaches to PPBM: no PPBML
implementation; a PPBM imlementation that is applied to 5% of passengers; and a
full (100%) implementation of PPBM. We made ranges of estimates concerning the
level of terrorist risk, the costs of PPBM operation, the consequences of successful
terrorist bombings, and the anti-terrorist effectiveness of both the partial and full
PPBM implementations. Calculations showed that there were circumstances under
which each policy was the most cost-effective of the three. Of the three options,
not implementing PPBM at all was the most cost-effective approach for the largest
percentage of the scenarios considered. We found that 5% PPBM captured the next
largest portion of the scenarios, and was generally the optimal strategy when annu-
al PPBMI operation costs were low, when 5% PPBM anti-terrorist effectiveness was
high, and when the consequences of successful bombings were severe. We found 100%(.
PPBM to be the optimal strategy for most scenarios which involved highly costly ter-
rorist bombings, a high level of terrorist risk, and a 100% PPBM policy that provided
much added security over 5% PPBM.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Civil aviation has historically been a target of terrorism. From 1949 to 1989, there
were more than 90 explosions aboard civilian aircraft as a result of sabotage. [9j Events
in recent years have heightened the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) sen-
sitivitv to the threat of terrorism. The 1993 bombing of the World Tradle Center,
in which approximately 1200 pounds of explosives killed 6 and injured 1042, [6] was
a reminder of the sophistication and magnitude of this threat. In 1996, US courts
convicted Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his co-conspirators for their part in a 1995 con-
spiracy to place explosive devices on twelve US passenger airliners operating in East
Asia. [7 According to the FAA, the 1995 conspiracy is evidence that:
(1) foreign terrorists conducting future attacks in the United States may
choose civil aviation as a target, despite the many more easily accessible
targets equally symbolic of America;
(2) foreign terrorists have the ability to operate in the United States; and
(3) foreign terrorists are capable of building and artfully concealing impro-
vised explosive devices that pose a serious challenge to aviation security. [2]
Three recent events give us evidence of the severe consequences of in-flight e(xplo-
sions. In 1985, a device exploded in the cargo hold of India Air flight 182. carlsing it
to crash into the ocean near Ireland. This disaster, which killed 329. was attritlut.cd
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to a terrorist, who had placed a bomb in luggage he had checked, and who t:llel dis-
embarked at an intermediate stop. In 1988, Pan American Airways (Pan Am) flight
103 was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device located in the plane's
forward cargo hold. The wreckage landed in Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 11, and all
259 people on board were killed. In 1989, a bomb in the forward cargo hold of Union
des Transportes Aeriens (UTA) flight 772 exploded, causing the aircraft to crash in
the Saharan Desert, killing 171. A Congolese man, who boarded at Brazzaville and
got off at Ndjarnera, was believed to have been responsible for the blast.[5]
In light of these incidents, the FAA has been exploring various counter-terrorism
measures that might mitigate this threat to civil aviation. One possibility the FAA
has considered is the use of explosives detection system (EDS) equipment, which
would scan checked baggage for explosive devices. EDS equipment, however, is not
yet widely available. The FAA has also considered the application of a security
measure called Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM) to domestic flights. PPBM is
already in use on international flights.
Applied properly, PPBM prevents checked luggage from traveling on a flight unless
it is known to have been checked by a passenger who is aboard the flight. If, at
departure time, airline employees find that an unaccompanied bag is on the flight,
PPBM policy dictates the removal of that bag from the airplane (hereafter, a 'bag-
pull"). Therefore, if a terrorist were to attempt to sabotage an airplane by means of
a device in checked luggage, successful PPBM would force him to accompany his bag
onto the airplane. He would have to intend on killing himself along with the other
passengers. Thus, PPBM potentially serves as both a deterrent and all obstacle to
terrorism.
PPBM is standard for virtually all international flights, and is required by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (TCAO). Though PPBNM is not required
for US dornmetic flights, US carriers currently perform a limited version of PPBM on
much of their flight network. The questions that have emerged are: Should PPBM be
implemented domestically, and, if so, how exactly? The White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security requested, in the Fall of 1996, that the FAA explore t.he
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optimal method by which to implement PPBM for US domestic flights. JrI response
to this request, The FAA created a PPBMI Technical Project Team (hereafter. PTP-
T), which included both the National Center of Excellence in Aviation )Operations
Research (NEXTOR) and the SABRE group. The task set, aside for this teamri was to
answer the questions about PPBM implementation posed above, and, in particllar,
to consid(er two forms of PPBM implementation: full-implementation, and a partial
implementation, which would expose just 5% of passengers to Bag-Match (hereafter,
5% PPBM).
In May 1.997, PTPT undertook a two-week Live Test of full domestic PPI3M,
to obtain an estimate of the costs and delays that a domestic implementation of'
PPBM would incur. The FAA considered the Live Test results and issuedl a Report
to Congress which included a comparison of "international-style" 100% PPBM and
57; PIPBM. In this Report, the FAA stated that the 5% policy would be superior to
the 100% policy if cost and operational delays were the only c(riteria, but that they are
niot. The FAA remarked that it was not straightforward whether 5% or 100% PPBM
was the optimal strategy, and that a policy's optimality depended on the magmitlde
of the terrorist threat.
In this thesis, we explore the question of whether PPBM should be implern entcd
d(omestically, and, if' so, at which level. Our models consider the long-term conorniC
costs of each of the three policies. The optimality of a PPBM policy depends on
assumptions about the underlying terrorist threat, the costs of PPBM irnplecrenta-
tion, the consequences of terrorist bomb attacks, and the effectiveness of' Bag-l.atc: h
in preventing these attacks. Obtaining results from our models requires that, we s-
tinate nullerous parameters. We can estimate some of these with accurac,. whlile
other parameters are harder to get a handle on, or are better left estimated by oth-
ers. Because of this, we do not settle on one set of parameter values, but inste.ad
explore the conditions under which one policy is superior to the others. 'We have
taken the approach of making low, mni(ddle, and high estimates for ach pIararletelr,
an(l constructing a set of what we thought were plausible scenarios based on t he.se
estimates.
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Our analysis indicates that not implementing PPBM at all is the optimal policy
in the largest percentage of the scenarios, followed next by 5% PPBM and then by
100% PPBM. W. found that 100% Bag-Match was most cost-effective for a majority
of the scenarios in which there was a high risk of terrorism and terrorist attacks were
very costly. If we added the assumption that 100% Bag-Match was very effective
in :)reventing terrorist attacks, it became the optimal policy in eight out of nine
scenarios. Our models indicated that 5% PPBM was most cost-effective for a majority
of cases in which PPBM operational costs were low and 5% PPBM was extremely
effective. If it was also the case that successful terrorist attacks were extremely costly,
5% PPBM performed substantially better. Finally, we found that the optirnality of
not implementing Bag-Match at all was highly dependent upon our assumptions about
the effectiveness of the 5% Bag-Match policy.
In section 1.1, we describe, in more detail, PPBM, the Live Test organized by
PTPT, and the current state of affairs regarding PPBM implementation. In section
1.2, we state the assumptions under which our models operate and the conventions we
will use throughout the thesis. In sections 1.3 and 1.4, we introduce two probabilistic
models, one in each section, and use them to derive equations for the comparison
of Bag-Match policy cost-effectiveness. We compare and contrast these models in
section 1.5, and set about estimating the parameters for the models and constructing
our set of scenarios in section 1.6. We explore the results from our models ill section
1.7, and provide a discussion of caveats in section 1.8. We end with a summary of
our analysis and conclusions in section 1.9.
1.1 PPBM, the Live Test, and the Present Policy
1.1.1 PPBM
As we have mentioned, the aim of PPBM is to prevent unaccompanied checked lug-
gage from traveling on passenger aircraft. To accomplish this aim, it is necessary to:
(1) prevent the loading of luggage that is not associated with any passenger. and (2)
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remove luggage that was checked by a passenger who is Inot present on the aircraft
at flight tinme (a bag-pull). Delays can result frorn verifying that each bag is properly
matched with a passenger on board, and fron a bag-pull in the case that a bag is not
properly matched. PPBMI must also contend with the case of connecting passenger-
s, who, if they had checked luggage, would cause a bag-pull by disernbarking at an
airport that is not their final destination.
The 5c Bag-Match policy (hereafter, 5% PPBM) uses passenger profiling to iden-
tify 5% of passengers as "'high-risk" and subjects them to PPBMI, while the remaining
passengers do not receive such scrutiny. The intent of passenger profiling is to cut
down on PPBM implementation costs and baggage-pull delays, while retaining mlany
of the security benefits of full PPBM implementation. The effectiveness of passenger
profiling hinges. of course, on how well dangerous passengers can be singled out.
1.1.2 Results from the Live Test
The PTPT decided to undertake a two-week Live Test of domestic PPBMI in order
to obtain better estimates of the costs and benefits of PPBM implementation. NEX-
TOR was largely responsible for the design, administration, and observation of the
test, which involved eleven airlines, 8,000 flights, and nearly 750,000 passengers and
delivered a full report of the Live 'rest to the FAA. A detailed description of the
conditions and results of the Live Test can be found in Barnett et al. [41
Based on this experiment, NEXTOR projected that a full implementation of PPB-
AI would delay roughly 1/7 of the flights, with the average delay being about seven
minutes. NEXTOR found that PPBM would cost the airlines approximately S(I.-40
per passenger enplanernent. Although the Live Test only emulated 100%(/ PPB.Xl.
VEXT()OR was asked by the FAA to comment on the costs we might expect 5 PPB3-
I to incur. Barnett et Al. gave a rule-of-thumb that delays drop about 757'I and
costs drop about 50cc"' as we move from 100% PPB.I to 5c PPBI, but pointe(l oi'z
the serious difficulties one encounters in attempting to estimate the d5% PPBI3 (costs
from the 100/c PPB\I data.
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1.1.3 Current State of Affairs
Before( tile Live Test, in February 1997, the White House Commission o Aviatioir
Safety and Security made the initial recommendation that the FAA should implemenlt
PPBM by December 31, 1997, and that this implementation should be based o1
passenger profiling. [8] After the Live Test, NEXTOR delivered a full report of the
experiment to the FAA.
The FAA considered the Live Test results in turn, and issued a Report to Congress
which included a comparison of "international-style" 100% PPBM and 5% PPBM.
In this Report, the FAA stated that the 5% policy would be superior to the 100%
policy if cost and operational delays were the only criteria, but they are not. Still,
as is evidenced by the following quote, the FAA concluded that the additional se-
curity provided by 100% PPBM over 5% PPBM did not justify the added cost and
inconvenience:
Based in part on the result of [NEXTOR's] study, the FAA believes that
a domestic 100% PPBM requirement is not the most feasible approach ...
Given the present level of domestic threat, the FAA believes that, bag-
matching of passengers selected by a FAA-approved computer-assisted
passenger screening (CAPS) system is better suited for domestic civil
aviation operations.[1]
In this same report, the FAA describes its plans for PPBM policy:
"The FAA will soon be proposing a rule entitled Security of Checked Bag-
gage on Flights Within the United States [FAA's emphasis] whic:h will
address [sic] FAA's goal to enhance checked baggage security measures
for domestic flights. The proposed rule will require U.S. carriers using
larger aircraft, to apply CAPS to all passengers."
To (late, the FAA has not made 5% PPBM the required policy. even for passelngrs
on larger aircraft. Most US airlines do currently apply 5% PPBI to their dorlmestic
travelers, however. For example, the author was subjected to PPBM while flying
from San Francisco to Boston in larch 2000.
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1.2 Model Assumptions
1.2.1 Conventions and Assumptions
We ''roceed under the following conventions/assurnptions:
(Al) WVe define an attack as the attempt of a terrorist or terrorist
group to detonate one or more explosive devices in checked luggage on
one or more US domestic, commercial flights. We will describe an attack
as successful if it results in at least one fatality.
In this study, we are primarily concerned with the terrorist attack process that
will be directly impacted by the Bag-Match security measure. This threshold for an
attack's success (i.e. causing at least one fatality) reflects our decision to focus on
effective terrorist attacks. If, for example, we were to label as "successful" all attack
which merely damages the interior of a plane's bathroom, we would be considering anl
incident in which the costs are several orders of magnitude fewer than for an attack
which causes fatalities.
(A2) Absent PPBM, future successful attacks will occur according to
a Poisson Process with rate A.
The Poisson Process is a natural representation for events which occur randomly
over time at a fixed average rate. A is interpreted as the average number of successful
attacks that will occur in a year in the future.
(A3) We consider three levels of PPBM implementation: 100% PPBM;
5% PPBM with passenger profiling; and no implementation of PPBM.
lIo simpl)lify notation, we will henceforth refer to "no PPBM implementation'" as
"O% PPBM." Let i E I, I = {0, 5, 100} be the indices corresponding to these three
levels.
(A4) We take k5 to be the conditional probability that an attack which
would have been successful under 0% PPBM, is still successful despite the
operation of 5% PPBM.
PPBI can serve to deter a terrorist who is planning an attack, and to fiil an
attack that is actually attempted. This robability incorporates both of t hese aslects
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of attack prevention for 5% PPBM.
(A5) We assume that 100% PPBM is at least as effective at preventing
attacks as 5% PPBM, and that 5% PPBM is at least as effective as 0%
PPBM. We take Yloo to be the conditional probability that an attack which
would have been successful under 5% PPBM, is still successful despite the
operation of 100% PPBM.
We are modeling the process of successful attacks under i% PPBM, i = 5,100,
as a Bernoulli splitting of a Poisson process, and, from probability theory, follows a
Poisson distribution with respective rates Ak5 and Ak 5 1 00. We are thus assuming the
existence of one underlying terrorist attack process, rather than three independent
Poisson processes with different rates. Note that the chance of an attack's success
under 100% Bag-Match, which is the product of k5 and Yloo, cannot exceed the chance
of its success under 5% Bag-Match, k5.
(A6) Let Bi be the yearly cost of maintaining an i% PPBM policy, not
including set-up costs. We treat Bo = 0 and we assume Bo < B5 < B100.
(A7) We assume that the start-up costs of PPBM are negligible when
compared to its recurrent costs.
(A8) Let Ci be the cost of a successful attack, given that the airline was
using i% PPBM at the time of the attack.
This cost has three components: the costs of compensation paid to the families
of people killed in the attack (which are often tied to major litigation), the cost of
damages to the aircraft, and the loss of passenger revenue in the wake of the successful
attack because some people will be frightened away from flying. (As we will see later,
these costs are difficult to estimate.)
1.2.2 Policy Adjustment Assumptions
In evaluating a process over a long time horizon, it is critical for us to consider both
the current process and any events that might precipitate changes in that process. In
particular, we are concerned with any PPBM policy changes that the FAA might un-
dertake in response to successful attacks. We consider two scenarios, which represent
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the extremes of FAA response:
(1) The FAA decides to leave in place the same PPBM policy that had been in
operation at the time of the successful attack. (hereafter, the "static" assumption)
(2) Immediately following the first successful terrorist attack, the FAA requires
airlines to implement 100% PPBM if it was not already in place. (hereafter, the
"dynamic" assumption)
In this analysis, we develop two different models, one which operates under the
static assumption (the "static model"), and another which operates under the dy-
namic assumption (the "dynamic model").
1.3 Static Model
If we assume that there are no policy changes in response to successful attacks, our
model is straightforward. Let Li be the expected yearly cost of i% PPBM. For a
Poisson process, the expected number of arrivals in a period of length 1 unit is just
the rate of that process. Since the 5% and 100% processes are split Poisson processes,
with respective rates Ak5 and Ak5-y1 0o, we find that:
Lo = Bo+ACo (1.1)
L5 = B + Ak5C5 (1.2)
Lloo = Bloo + Ak5y1ooC1oo (1.3)
Comparing the long-term expected cost of each policy for this model is equivalent
to comparing among Lo, L5, and Lloo. Let us say that policy i "dominates" policy
j if policy i is strictly cheaper than policy j in a long-term expected cost sense.
For the static policy, i% PPBM dominates j% PPBM if L, < Lj. A PPBM policy
is optimal if and only if it dominates the other two PPBM policies. We note the
inherent transitivity in such comparisons (i.e. if i% PPBM dominates j% PPBM, and
j% PPBM dominates k% PPBM, then i PPBM dominates k% PPBM).
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1.4 Dynamic Model
If we assume that the FAA requires a switch to 100% PPBM when there is a successful
attack under the less strict PPBM policies, the picture becomes more complicated.
Let us consider a period of length T, where T > 0. For T sufficiently large, we can
be sure that a successful attack will occur during that period regardless of the level of
PPBM implementation (in fact, for the subsequent equations to hold, we only need
this to be true for the 0% and 5% policies). Let Ai,, be the expected cost of j% PPBM
over a period of length T minus the expected cost of i% PPBM over that same period.
Let ti be the time of the first successful attack under i% PPBM. The expected value
of to is 1/A, since its distribution is exponential with rate A. Therefore,
Bo I)(Bo k o (1.4)
A0,oo = T(Bloo + k5VloC1oo00) - [ o + Co + (T - +)(Bloo  k5Y1 oCoo),l (14)
where the first term in the equation represents the expected cost incurred over
time T with 100% PPBM in operation, and the second term represents the sum of
the cost incurred over time 1/A under 0% PPBM, the successful attack under 0%
PPBM, and the cost incurred over time T - 1/A under 100% PPBM, in that order.
Note that this first term is drawn directly from equation 1.3.
We see that 0% PPBM dominates 100% PPBM when Ao,loo > 0, or, equivilently,
when:
T(Bloo + Ak5- 100C100 ) > B-C + Co (T- )(Boo + ooCoo)
> + Co- -kslooClooAA
Bloo + ks5 looCoo > Bo + ACo (1.5)
Refering back to equations 1.1 and 1.3, we see that our evaluation of the relative
cost-effectiveness of 0% and 100% PPBM is independent of which model we use.
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Let us now compare 5% and 100% PPBM, noting that E[t5 = 1/(Ak5).
A5,1oo = T(Boo + Ak5syooCjoo) - [A + C5 + (T- k
Ak 5 A5k
)(Bloo + Ak571OOCl1O)],
(1.6)
where we have the same structure as in equation 1.4.
Thus 5% PPBM dominates 100% PPBM when:
T(Bloo + Ak5slooCloo) > B 5B5 +C + (T-Ak 5
0> + C5 -
B loo + AksylooCloo > B5 + Ak5C5
)(Bloo
k5
Bloo
Ak 5
+ Aks5lyooCloo)
- 71ooC1oo
From this result, and equations 1.2 and 1.3, we see that our comparison equation
is again independent of model.
Finally, we compare the 0% and 5% PPBM policies under the dynamic model:
1
k )(B1oo + AksV0oCloo)]k5
Bo 1
- I + Co + (T - 1)(Boo+ Ak5l'yooCloo)) (1.8)
We see that 0% PPBM dominates 5% PPBM when Ao,s > 0, or, equivalently,
when:
B5 1[A + C5 + (T - Ak)(Bloo + Aksy1ooC1 oo)]
> [o +CoA[+c + (T - )(Bloo + AksYlooCloo)]+
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(1.7)
Ao,5 = [ -5 + C5 + (T-
(1.9)
B5 Book + AC5 - AylooCloo > Bo + ACo - Bloo - Aks5 1 ooC1 oo
B5-S + (k - 1) ( k + AlooCoo) > Bo + ACo (1.10)
In equation 1.10, we see our dynamic model first deviate from the static model.
We note the presence of three terms, B 0 0, Clo00, and Yloo, which were not present
in equations 1.1 or 1.2. In the comparison of 0% and 5% PPBM under the static
model, terms that are associated with 100% PPBM do not enter the equation (no
pun intended) because we assume that airlines will not switch to 100% PPBM at
any point. We find these terms in the dynamic model, however, due to fact that
we expect the first successful attack, and therefore the switch to 100% PPBM, to
occur earlier under 0% PPBM than under 5% PPBM, if k5 < 1. We can see this
clearly by considering a specific scenario. Let us assume that we have decided not
to implement PPBM. Let us also assume that the first successful attack occurs after
to years without PPBM implementation. Had 5% PPBM been in operation instead,
we would expect this very attack to succeed with probability ks . If the attack were
prevented by 5% PPBM, 5% PPBM would remain in operation until an attack proved
successful. It is the potential difference between to and t5 that introduces an implicit
consideration of the 100% PPBM policy parameters. We expect to have 100% PPBM
in operation for a longer period of time under 0% PPBM than under 5% PPBM, so
the costs of 100% PPBM must enter the picture.
1.5 Model Comparison
1.5.1 Equivalence
Here we explore the conditions under which our static and dynamic models yield
the same equation for comparing the 0% and 5% PPBM policies. In doing so, we
will have determined the parameter constraints under which the static and dynamic
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models yield an identical set of policy optimality conditions, due to the fact that the
models give us identical equations for comparing 0% to 100% PPBM, and 5% to 100%
PPBM.
In the simple case of k5 = 1, which corresponds to 5% PPBM adding no additional
attack prevention, we find that the equation for dominance of 0% PPBM over 5%
PPBM is identical under each model. Setting k5 = 1 in the comparison of equation 1.1
and equation 1.2, as well as in equation 1.10, yields:
B5 + AC5 > Bo +ACo (1.11)
Intuitively, when k5 = 1 for the dynamic model, we will find that to = t5, and
the switch to 100% PPBM will occur at the same time under each policy. We are
essentially comparing the expected costs of the two policies up to that switch, so none
of the parameters for 100% PPBM are present in equation 1.11. In the more plausible
case of k5 < 1, we need to look for parameter values that will make equation 1.10
equivalent to the static model comparison equation:
B5 + Ak5C5 > Bo + ACo (1.12)
By inspection, for equations 1.10 and 1.12 to be equivalent, we need the following
to hold true:
B5 + Ak5 C5 + AC5+ (k5 - 1)( kB + AoCl°° )
0 - (k 5 - 1)[l + AlooCloo - AC5]
0 Bloo- B5 + A(yooCoo - C5) (1.13)
k5e see that, forour wo m dels to yield equivalent results, we need either k = 1
We see that, for our two models to yield equivalent results, we need either k = 1
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(from before), or B5 = Blo0 and C5 = 'Y10oCloo Let us try to give some intuition for
equation 1.13. If B5 = B10o and C5 = y1ooC1oo, the 5% and 100% PPBM policies
have the same yearly maintenance cost, and the same expected yearly cost due to
successful attacks, since it will be true that Ak5C5 = Ak5 lyooCloo. In an expected cost
sense, then, the 5% and 100% PPBM policies are identical, so our comparison of the
expected costs of 0% PPBM to 5% PPBM becomes a comparison of 0% PPBM to
100% PPBM, which is the same for both the static and dynamic models.
1.5.2 Inconsistency
These results imply that, for a given set of parameters, we might find that our static
model and dynamic model differ on which PPBM policy is optimal. Furthermore,
this difference can only occur if the disputed optimal policies are 0% and 5% PPBM.
This is easy to see. Let us assume that the dynamic model gives 100% PPBM as
optimal. Since the conditions for dominance of 100% PPBM over 0% PPBM and
for 100% PPBM over 5% PPBM are identical under each model, 100% must have a
lower expected cost than both 0% and 5% PPBM under the static model as well. The
reverse direction is true since we could have simply replaced "dynamic" with "static"
and "static" with "dynamic" in the short proof above.
1.6 Parameter Estimation
1.6.1 The Method
To obtain results from these models, we must first estimate numerous parameters.
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to get accurate estimates for most of these pa-
rameters. As a result, we have avoided the straightforward, but myopic, method of
assigning a single estimate to each parameter, and calculating the optimal PPBM
policy from this single set of estimates. Instead, we have taken the approach of es-
timating a range of values for a given parameter. In particular, we choose a high,
middle, and low estimate for each parameter. We then consider each possible com-
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bination of parameter estimates as one scenario. For example, one scenario might
consist of the high A estimate, the low B100 estimate, the middle k5 estimate, and so
on. We then use our PPBM policy dominance equations to determine, for both the
static and dynamic models, which policy is optimal under each parameter scenario.
From this analysis, we obtain the percentages of the scenarios for which each PPBM
policy is optimal, under each model. A similar approach for coping with parameters
that are difficult to estimate can be found in [3].
1.6.2 The Parameters
First and foremost, we consider the issue of estimating A, the yearly rate of successful,
domestic terrorist attacks which involve explosives in checked luggage. It is natural
to turn immediately to the historical rate of such incidents. We find that the last
successful attack of this type occured in 1955, on United Air Lines flight #629 from
Denver to Seattle. It would be difficult to accurately estimate A based on this single
incident. In addition, looking at data before 1955 is of limited use, as the number of
domestic flights is orders of magnitude larger today than it was then. We thus look
to the historical record for international flights. Drawing on a variety of sources, we
have compiled a list of acts of aggression by terrorists on US and international civil
aviation from 1950-1999. In this list, found in Appendix A, we include only incidents
which resulted in at least one fatality and were confirmed or assumed to have been
caused by explosive devices in checked luggage. Seven of these eight incidents involved
international flights. Currently, approximately half of all flights are US domestic
flights, so we could imagine basing our estimate of A on the rate of incidents among
flights that are not US domestic. This rate, based on Appendix A, is 0.14 incidents
per year (7 incidents over 50 years). Based on this logic, we could imagine a A as low
as 0.02 (1 incident in 50 years) or as high as 0.14. We take these two values to be
our low and high estimates for A, and their midpoint, 0.08 incidents/year, to be our
middle estimate.
We next look to the Live Test results in order to estimate B5 and Boo0 (we assumed
B0 = 0). NEXTOR estimated that 100% PPBM would cost airlines sornewhere
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between $0.25 and $0.52 per emplanement. This corresponds to an expense of $0.38 to
$0.65 per emplanement for additional staff, automation technology, and flight delays,
and a credit of $0.13 per emplanement for the reduction in baggage mishandling.
Based on the FAA projection of 656.5 million US domestic emplanements during the
year 2000 [10], the annual dollar cost corresponding to this cost range is $164 to $341
million dollars. We take those extremes to be the low and high estimates, and their
mean, $252.5 million, to be the middle estimate.
Although the Live Test involved only 100% PPBM, NEXTOR was also asked to
estimate the costs of 5% PPBM. It does not suffice, of course, to arrive at a range
for B 5 by dividing the estimated range for B100 by twenty. For instance, an airline
might choose to invest in automatic boarding-pass readers in order to implement
100% PPBM, but not for a 5% PPBM implementation. After citing this and other
estimation difficulties, Barnett et al. proceeded to estimate that costs under 5%
PPBM would fall to a range of $0.07 to $0.36 [4]. This range corresponds to, under
the projection of 656.5 million domestic emplanement per year, a yearly cost ranging
from $46 to $236 million. We take the midpoint of that range, $141 million, to be
our middle estimate.
We next tackle the task of estimating the cost of a successful attack under the
three PPBM policies, Co, C5, and C100. This cost is composed of the damage inflicted
upon the aircraft, the payments resulting from various lawsuits, and the drop in ticket
sales due to potential airline passengers' fear of terrorism. Some of these costs are
dependent upon the security policy that was in place at the time of the successful
attack. While we have no reason to believe that the cost of the damage to the
aircraft will be any different under different PPBM policies, we might expect legal
settlement costs to be lower for an airline that was using 100% PPBM ("doing all
that it could") rather than 0% PPBM, all else equal. On the other hand, perhaps
the drop in ticket revenue would be larger for a successful attack under 100% PPBM
than under the two less-strict policies. This could result from a passenger thinking
the following, if 100% had been in operation at the time of the attack: "The airlines
were doing all they could, and the terrorists still succeeded. I will take the train from
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now on." Any assumptions about the differences between Co, C5, and Cloo would
be highly speculative. Indeed, we have just presented possible scenarios for which
the loss of ticket revenue would be more costly, but the legal costs smaller, for Cl00
than for Co or C5. Therefore, we have decided to operate under the assumption that
Co = C = Coo, neither due to precise analysis nor because we think that this is
actually the case, but because we do not have convincing evidence for alternatives.
Let C Co = C = Coo.
These costs are also highly dependent on the magnitude of the incident. In partic-
ular, we are concerned with estimating the costs which result from the explosion of a
device that was brought onto the plane via checked luggage. If we consider the eight
such events from Appendix A, we find that in six cases, all people aboard the plane
were killed, and in another, just one passenger, who fell 15,000 feet in the tailsection,
survived. In the remaining incident, two explosions occurred while the aircraft was
on the ground, killing two and severely damaging the aircraft. When we make our
estimates for C, we bear in mind the severity of the consequences of these eight inci-
dents. There is also the possibility of a terrorist group orchestrating the destruction
of multiple aircraft. Indeed, the aforementioned Yousef plot involved plans to place
explosive devices on twelve US passenger airlines. Our high estimate for C will be
based on a hypothetical incident which results in the destruction of multiple aircraft.
To formulate our estimates for C, we will first lay the framework for estimating each
of the cost components, and then arrive at the low, high, and middle estimates based
on that framework.
First let us consider the expected cost of resulting lawsuits. The 1988 crash of
Pan Am flight 103 is a logical first stop for this estimation. As I mentioned in the
Introduction, 270 were killed in the crash: 243 passengers, 16 crew, and 11 on the
ground.[14] A 1996 article by the Associated Press states that "So far, Pan Am has
paid an estimated $500 million in damages, and about 20 more cases are pending,
according to lawyers for American victims." [15]
The second component of the Cis is the loss of revenue in the wake of the incident.
This loss has two sources: airlines will lower fares to attract a more reluctant set of
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customers and some customers will decide not to fly at all, despite the fare reductions.
In 1997, US domestic passenger revenue was approximately $80 billion. Ill] The Air
Transport Association predicts approximately 10% more passenger enplanements for
2000 than 1997 [12], and we will estimate $90 billion to be the annual domestic
revenue figure for the year 2000. It is difficult for us to estimate the loss of revenue
due to airline crashes from historical data, due to the presence of substantial noise.
Perhaps we could get a reasonably accurate figure for Pan Am's loss of revenue in
the years subsequent to the crash, but much of that revenue went into the coffers of
British Airways. Some passengers might, in effect, boycott the carrier involved in an
incident, but give their business freely to another carrier. However, this obfuscates
the picture, as we are interested in the system-wide costs. In addition, there is the
issue of measuring how long these effects might last. Faced with these difficulties, we
prefer to take the, again highly-speculative, approach of estimating percentage losses
of the annual, US domestic flight revenue estimate for the year 2000.
Finally, we turn to the cost of the damage to the aircraft. In seven of the eight
checked luggage incidents from Appendix A, the airplane itself was destroyed. In the
other incident, the plane was severely damaged. In May, 2000, the range of prices
for Boeing's commercial aircraft is from $33 to $202 million [13], so we will take
the average cost of an aircraft to be approximately $100 million. A more accurate
estimate would, of course, analyze what proportion of the US domestic fleet each
aircraft constitutes, and the average depreciation on US domestic aircraft.
Let us now compose our high, low, and middle estimates for C, in that order.
Pan Am flight 103 crashed twelve years before the composition of this thesis, and the
last twenty lawsuits to be resolved could very well be the most expensive. For an
incident that involved two or three planes, we could therefore conceive of legal fees
and lawsuit settlements amounting to two billion dollars. For that same incident, we
would expect there to be substantial media coverage of the incident, which would
lead to a large loss of revenue. However, it would be hard to imagine a loss greater
than 5% of the annual revenue, which comes to $4.5 billion. Adding in the cost of
multiple aircraft, we could imagine $7 billion for the high estimate of C.
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For the low estimate of C, let's examine the case of the Middle East Airlines
airplane which exploded on the ground at Beirut. Two were killed when two parcels
exploded as luggage was being off-loaded from the aircraft. We could imagine an
incident of this magnitude resulting in costs from aircraft damage and lawsuits of
$200 million, and additionally, an annual revenue loss of a third of a percent. This
comes to $500 million, and we use this for our low estimate of C. Finally, a moderate
incident might destroy the aircraft, involve lawsuit-related costs of $750 million, and
cause a drop in ticket revenue of one percent of annual domestic revenue. We take
this sum, $1.75 billion, to be our moderate estimate for C. To summarize, our high,
low, and middle estimates for C are, respectively, $7 billion, $500 million, and $1.75
billion dollars.
There are two parameters that remain to be estimated: k5 and Yloo. k5 , again, is
the probability that an attack which would have been successful under 0% PPBM,
will also be successful despite the operation of 5% PPBM. Yloo is the probability that
an attack which would have been successful under 5% PPBM, will still be successful
despite the operation of 100% PPBM. Note that both k5 and yloo are between zero
and one. k5 = 1 corresponds to 5% PPBM providing no more security than does 0%
PPBM. Likewise, 1oO = 1 corresponds to 100% PPBM providing no more security
than does 5% PPBM. Unlike many of the other parameters, k5 and Yloo can not be
estimated from historical data. Even if, for instance, another country had implement-
ed 5% PPBM in the past, it would be near impossible to get an accurate idea of the
number of terrorists who were deterred solely from the operation of 5% PPBM. For
lack of a more methodical alternative, we consider a few reasonable scenarios, and
base our estimates on those scenarios.
Let our first scenario consist of eight terrorist attacks via checked luggage that
would have been attempted and successful under 0% PPBM over some time interval.
We ask ourselves the question, "How many of these would have been deterred or foiled
by 5% PPBM?" If 5% PPBM were highly effective, the answer might be "six." If 5%
PPBM were ineffective, maybe only one attempt would be deterred or foiled. If 5%
PPBM were moderately effective, we could imagine that it would deter or foil three
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Low Estimate Middle Estimate High Estimate
A 0.02 incidents/year 0.08 0.14
B 5 $46 million/year $141 mil. $236 mil.
Bloo $164 million/year $252.5 mil. $341 mil.
Co, C, C100oo $500 million/incident $1.75 bil. $7 bil.
ks __ 0.25 0.5625 0.875
"ioo 0.125 0.5 0.875
Table 1.1: Range of Estimates for Parameter Values
or four events. The k5 values corresponding to these statements are 0.25, 0.875, and
0.5625, and we will make these our estimates for k5.
Now consider eight terrorist attacks via checked luggage that would have been
attempted and successful under 5% PPBM. How many of these would have been
deterred or foiled by 100% PPBM? We put forth one, four, and seven as our low,
middle, and high responses to that question. Based on these responses, our estimates
for 7Yoo are 0.125, 0.5, and 0.875.
A summary of these results can be found in Table 1.1.
At this point, I would like to once again emphasize that our methods of estimation
are highly approximate, as the reader has observed. Indeed, if the reader feels strongly
that one or more estimates were substantially inaccurate, she is invited to revise
those estimates and use the equations we have provided to obtain her own results
and conclusions. Finally, if the reader has hands-on experience in aviation safety,
she is particularly well-positioned to bring that experience to bear on the parameter
estimation procedure, and we would encourage her to do so.
1.7 Results
1.7.1 Method
It is evident that we can determine which PPBM policy is optimal for a given set of
parameters, under either of the models we have presented. We examined numerous
scenarios, composed from the high, low, and middle parameter estimates, seeking to
gain an understanding of how each Bag-Match strategy performed overall, and which
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0% PPBM 5% PPBM 100%
PPBM
Static Model 69.5% 16.5% 14.0%
Dynamic Model 44.4% 41.6% 14.0%
Table 1.2: Percentage of Time Each of the PPBM Policies Achieved Lowest Long-
term Cost, Under 243 Parameter Combinations and Both the Static and Dynamic
Models
sets of circumstances favored which Bag-Match strategy. A straightforward approach
would involve examining all possible combinations of our parameter estimates, which,
because we have six parameters, would encompass 36 = 729 possibilities. However,
this direct approach would allow one set of scenarios with B5 = $236 million and
B100 = $164 million (i.e. in which 5% Bag-Match costs more than 100% Bag-Match).
To avoid this absurdity, we make the assumption that the B5 and Bloo parameter
estimates both take the same "status" (high, middle, or low value), which reduces
our number of scenarios to 35 = 243. (Note that, under the definitions of k5 and 'yoo,
there is never any chance that 5% Bag-Match will be treated as more effective against
terrorist attacks than 100% Bag-Match.)
1.7.2 Overall Analysis
We entered these 243 scenarios into an Excel spreadsheet, along with the PPBM
policy dominance equations for the static and dynamic models. We then calculated
which Bag-Match policy achieved the lowest long-term cost for each scenario, under
both the static and dynamic models. In Table 1.2, we list the percentages of the
scenarios for which each Bag-Match policy was optimal, under each model.
These percentages point to two trends: (1) 0% PPBM is optimal in a plurality of
the scenarios under each model (a majority under one of them); and (2) 5% PPBM
does substantially better, and 0% substantially worse, under the dynamic model than
under the static model.
That 100% PPBM is optimal in an identical percentage of cases is not a surprise:
we mentioned in Section 1.5.2, if 100% is optimal for a given scenario under the static
model, so too will it be optimal for the dynamic model, and vice-versa. Examining
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the results of our calculations, we find that no scenario exists for which 5% PPBM
is optimal under the static model, while 0% PPBM is optimal under the dynamic
model. For 25.1% of the scenarios, 0% Bag-Match is optimal under the static model,
while 5% Bag-Match is optimal under the dynamic model.
1.7.3 Specific Outcome Analysis
At this stage, we would like to examine the optimality results for various scenarios
in order to illustrate which circumstances result in which PPBM strategy optimality
outcomes. To facilitate this, let us introduce notation that will completely character-
ize a scenario. We have six parameters, but B5 and B100 are linked, so each scenario
can be characterized by a set of five letters, where each letter is either L, M, or H,
corresponding to low, middle, or high parameter estimates. For example, we would
interpret [L, M, H, L, Hi as a scenario in which, in order, A is at its low estimate,
B5 and B 100 are at their middle estimates, C is at its high estimate, k5 is at its low
estimate, and Yloo is at its high estimate.
100% Bag-Match Optimality
Let us first examine the 34 scenarios for which 100% Bag-Match is optimal under
each model. These are listed in Table 1.3.
Scanning through these scenarios, we see that C equals our high estimate in 32 of
the 34 scenarios, while in the other two scenarios, it equals our middle estimate. In
addition, A must equal our middle or high estimate for 100% PPBM to be optimal.
We also notice that Yloo never takes on the value corresponding to lowest further
effectiveness beyond 5% Bag-Match. A simple calculation reveals that if incidents
are extremely frequent and costly (i.e. high A and C), 100% Bag-Match is optimal
2/3 of the time. If it is also true that 100% Bag-Match is highly effective (low Y10oo),
100% PPBM is optimal 88.9% of the time. These results imply that having frequent
and costly incidents, and an extremely effective 100% Bag-Match system, contribute
substantially to the optimality of 100% Bag-Match.
28
Scenario Encoding: [A, B5 and B1ow C, k5, Yl_ _ _
[M, L, H, L, L [M,M, H,L,L] H, H,L, L]
[M, L, H, M, L] [M, M, H, M, L] [M, H, H, M, L]
[M, L, H, M, M] [M, M, H, M, M] [M, H, H, M, M]
[M, L, H, H, LI [M, , H, H, L] [M, H, H, H, L]
[M, L, H, H. MI [M, M, H, H, M] [H, L, H, L, L]
[H, M, H, L, L] [H, H, H, L, L] [H, L, H, L, M]
[H, M, H, L, M] [H, H, H, L, M] [H, L, M, M, L]
[H, L, H,. M, L] [H, M, H, M, LI [H, H, H, M, L]
[H, L, H, M, M] [H, M, H, M, M] [H, H, H, M, MI
[H, L, M, H, L] [H, L, H, H, L] [H, M, H, H, L]
[H, H, H, H, Li [H, L, H, H, M] [H, M H, H, M]
[H, H, H, H, MI] _____ _ __I
Table 1.3: List of Scenarios in which 100% Bag-Match is Optimal for Both Models
If scenarios evidence all levels of estimates of a particular parameter, it will prove
useful to consider a numeric measure of the "average" level for that parameter in a
given scenario set. Let us pair the following integers with our estimate levels: "1" for
a high estimate; "0" for a middle estimate; and "-1" for a low estimate. We define
a parameter's "average" in a given scenario set to be the numerical average of the
integers that correspond to the estimate levels that this parameter takes on in the
scenario set. For instance, if in a set of six scenarios, A equals the high estimate
three times, the middle estimate twice, and the low estimate once, we would say
that the "average" of A for this scenario set is 1/3 (since 3(1)+2(0)+1(-) = 3). Note
that an average with a high (approaching 1) absolute value indicates a large degree
of correlation between a parameter estimate level and a set of scenarios. Finally, we
will use "AVG(x)" as shorthand for the average of parameter "x" for a given scenario
set.
The set of scenarios in Table 1.3 evidences all levels of estimates for annual PPBM
costs and 5% PPBM effectiveness, with the average of Bs/Bloo equal to -0.09, and
the average of k5 equal to 0.09. These averages imply that the scenarios in this set
include a few more cases with low annual PPBM costs than with high, and a few
more cases with low 1 5% PPBM effectiveness than with high. These results seems to
1 High (Low) estimates for k5 and Yloo correspond to 100% and 5% Bag-Match having low (high)
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imply that annual PPBM costs and 5% PPBM effectiveness have less of an impact on
100% PPBM optimality than do incident-related costs, incident frequency, and tile
security added by 100% PPBM. In fact, even if annual PPBM costs are high, 100%
PPBM is optimal for 2/3 of the cases if incident-related costs and incident frequency
are also high. Likewise, if 5% is highly effective, 100% PPBM is optimal for 2/3 of
the cases if incident-related costs and incident frequency are again, also high. We
calculate the averages of A, C, and Yloo to be 0.58, 0.94, and -0.58, respectively.
Overall, then, we give the following order for degree of parameter correlation with
100% PPBM optimality, with the relevant parameter "average"in parenthesis: high
incident-related costs (0.94), high risk of terrorism (0.58), high level of added security
from 100% Bag-Match (-0.58), low 5% PPBM effectiveness (0.09), and low annual
PPBM costs (-0.09). (Note that the average of any given parameter over the entire
set of 243 scenarios is 0.)
5% Bag-Match Optimal Under the Dynamic and Static Models
Let us now examine the 40 scenarios for which 5% Bag-Match is optimal under both
the static and dynamic models. We find these scenarios listed in Table 1.4.
In this set of scenarios, the "averages" for B5/B10 0 and k5 have the same value,
-0.55. For C, yYloo, and A, the averages are 0.525, 0.375, and 0.3, respectively. When
annual PPBM costs are at our low estimate and 5% Bag-Match is extremely effective
(low k5), 5% Bag-Match is optimal under both the dynamic and static models 55.6%
of the time. If it is also the case that incidents are very expensive (high C), 5%
Bag-Match is optimal for both models 2/3 of the time. These parameter averages
are consistent with what we might expect: in scenarios for which 5% PPBM is most
cost-effective under both models, 5% PPBM tends to be more effective at preventing
terrorist attacks, PPBM annual costs tend to be lower, and successful attack costs
tend to be higher.
Comparing these results to the results for the scenarios from Table 1.3, we note
effectiveness. Therefore, positive averages for these two parameters give evidence of a tendency for
lower PPBM effectiveness levels within a set of scenarios.
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Encoding: [A, B5 and Bloo , k 5 , oloo]
[L, L, H, L, L] [L, L, H, L, M] [L, L, H, L, H]
[L, L, H, M, L] [L, L, H, M, M] [L, L, H, M, H]
[M, L, M, L, L] [M, L, M, L, M] [M, L, H, L, M]
[M, M, H, L, M] [M, H, H, L, M] [M, L, M, L, H]
[M, L, H, L, H [M, M, H, L, H] [M, H, H, L, H]
[M, L, M, M, L] [M, L, M, M, M] [M, L, M, M, H]
[M,L,HM, H] [M, LM, H, M, H [M, MH, H, M, H]
[M, L, H, H, H] [H, L, L, L, L] [H, L, M, L, L]
[H, M, M, L, L] [H, L, L, L, M] [H, L, M, L, M]
[H, M, H, L, M] [H, L, L L, H] [H, L, M, L, H
[H, L, H, L, HI [H, M, M, L, H] [H, M, H, L, H]
[H, H, H, L, H] [H, L, M, MI, M] [H, L, M, M, H]
[H, L, H, M, H] [H, M, H, M, H] [H, H, H, M, H]
[H, L, H, H .H]
Table 1.4: List of Scenarios in which 5% Bag-Match is Optimal for Both Models.
that the average of C is much higher in the scenarios for which 100% PPBM was
optimal under both models than its average is for this set of scenarios (0.94 as com-
pared with 0.525). While 100% PPBM is very rarely optimal (2.5% of the time) when
incident-related costs are at our low or middle estimate, 5% PPBM performs slightly
better in those circumstances, as it is optimal 9.9% of the time. It might be that 5%
PPBM performs better because there needs to be a larger cost savings from prevented
terrorist attacks for 100% PPBM than 5% PPBM to justify the higher annual costs
of 100% PPBM. We also note that the average for the PPBM annual cost parameter
was more highly negative for this set of scenarios (-0.55) than it was for scenarios for
which 100% PPBM was optimal under each model (-0.09). From this, it seems that
5% PPBM optimality is more sensitive to PPBM annual costs than is 100% PPBM
optimality.
Examining the table, we note that it is almost always the case (38/40 scenarios)
that 100% Bag-Match is not maximally effective. When 100% Bag-Match is maxi-
mally effective, it is almost never the case that 5% Bag-Match is the optimal strategy
for both models, and this is presumably because an effective 100% Bag-Match policy
provides a preferable alternative to 5% Bag-Match.
Overall, we have noted the following: in scenarios for which 5% PPBMI is most
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Low Estimate Middle Estimate High Estimate
A 41.7% 30.6% 27.8%
B.&B 1oo 18.5% 39.8% 41.7%
C- 41.7% 39.8% 18.5%
k5 -- 0.0% 38.0% 62.0%
7Yo0 31.5% 33.3% 35.2%
Table 1.5: Parameter Estimate Percentages for the Scenarios in which O% Bag-Match
is Optimal for the Static and Dynamic Models
cost-effective under both models, (in order of decreasing absolute value of parameter
average) 5% PPBM tends to be more effective (AVG(k5) = -0.55), annual PPBM costs
tend to be lower (AVG(B 5/B 1 oo) = -0.55), incident-related costs tend to be higher
(AVG(C) = 0.525), 100% PPBM tends to offer less added security over 5% PPBM
(AVG(yloo) = 0.375), and successful attacks tend to be more frequent (AVG(A) =
0.3).
0% PPBM Optimal for the Dynamic and Static Models
We next consider the set of scenarios for which no PPBM implementation at all is
the most cost-effective strategy under both models, which represents 44.4% of the
original scenario set. Listing all 108 scenarios from this set would be excessive, so we
will instead make general observations regarding these scenarios, and mention a few
illustrative cases. In Table 1.5, we list the percentage of these 108 scenarios for which
each parameter took on the low, middle, and high estimates.
For this set of scenarios, the "averages" for k5, B5/B 0 0 , and C are 0.62, 0.23,
and -0.23, respectively. For A and Yloo, those averages are -0.14 and 0.04. We would
expect the 0% Bag-Match strategy to be more competitive for low A, high ongoing
Bag-Match costs, low incident-related costs, and low effectiveness for the two Bag-
Match implementations, and our averages are in line with these expectations.
k5 's average stands out the most, at 0.62, and implies that these scenarios tend
to have low levels of 5% PPBM effectiveness. It makes sense that 0% Bag-Match's
competitiveness is generally aided by 5% PPBM being less effective, but we notice
from Table 1.5 that these scenarios do not include a single case of 5% PPBM being
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highly-effective. According to our analysis, if 5% PPBM is highly-effective, we should
not expect 0% PPBM to be optimal under both models. When 5% Bag-Match is
highly ineffective, 0% Bag-Match is optimal for both models 82.7% of the time.
Let us look in particular at two scenarios from this set: [L, M, H, M, L], and [M,
M, Ml, M, M]. In this first case, incidents are infrequent, Bag-Match maintenance is
moderately expensive, successful attacks prove extremely costly to the system, 5%
PPBM1 is moderately effective, and 100% PPBM adds much security to 5 PPBM.
Despite some parameter values that are quite favorable to PPBM, 0% Bag-Match is
optimal under both models, in part due to the infrequency of incidents. For the static
model, 0% PPBM is optimal 92.6% of the time when A is at our low estimate. When
we move to the dynamic model, if A is at our low estimate, 0% PPBM is optimal
55.6% of the time. Particularly under the static model, there are few circumstances
under which 0% Bag-Match is not optimal and incidents are very infrequent.
With the second listed scenario, we see that 0% PPBM is optimal under both
models for the "perfectly average" scenario according to our parameter estimates. If
we change this scenario so that 5% Bag-Match becomes highly effective, 0% Bag-
Match is still optimal under the static model, but 5% becomes optimal under the
dynamic model.
Overall, in scenarios from this set, 5% Bag-Match tends to add little security
(AVG(k5) = 0.62), Bag-Match annual costs tend to be high (AVG(B 5/Bloo) = 0.23),
incident-related costs tend to be lower (AVG(C) = -0.23), and the terrorist risk tends
to be lower (AVG(A) = -0.14).
Optimal Policy Different Across Models
Finally, we consider the set of scenarios for which no PPBM implementation at all
is the most cost-effective strategy under the static model, but 5% PPBM is optimal
under the dynamic model. These 61 scenarios represent 25.1% of the original scenario
set. In Table 1.6, we list the percentage of these scenarios for which each parameter
took on the low, middle, and high estimates.
For this scenario set, we calculate the averages of k5, C, and A to be -0.79, -0.44,
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Low Estimate Middle Estimate High Estimate
A 49.1% 29.5%" 21.3%
B 5&B1 00 34.4% 31.1% 34.4%
C 54.1% 36.1% 9.8%
k5 78.7% 21.3% 0.0%
1)0' 32.8% 32.8% 34.4% 
Table 1.6: Parameter Estimate Percentages for the Scenarios in which 0% Wins for
the Static Model, but 5% Wins for the Dynamic Model
and -0.28, respectively, while the averages of Ylou and B5/lBoo are just 0.02 and 0.00,
respectively.
The importance of high 5% Bag-Match effectiveness (low k5) in 5% Bag-Match's
optimality under the dynamic model makes intuitive sense. Why the averages of C
and A are negative is more difficult to understand. Indeed, a priori it is harder to
imagine which parameter levels will bring about the case of 0% Bag-Match optimal-
ity under the static model but 5% Bag-Match optimality under the dynamic model
(hereafter, the "split optimality" case). A high value in a given parameter might
contribute to the optimality of 5% PPBM, but work against the optimality of 0%
PPBM. Perhaps we do not see many scenarios here for which incidents are very fre-
quent and costly because those characteristics would prevent 0% from being optimal
in the static case, as they did in our analysis of the "no PPBM implementation wins
under both models" case. When 5% Bag-Match is highly effective (low ks) and "in-
expensive" (low C), the split optimality case will occur 88.9% of the time. In these
circumstances, it becomes all the more important to consider the static and dynam-
ic assumptions, as the optimality of a PPBM policy is highly dependent on which
assumption is made.
Let us look at the following scenario from the "split optimality" set: [M, L, L,
M, H]. Here, 5% Bag-Match is moderately effective, while incidents are moderate-
ly frequent and relatively inexpensive. Annual Bag-Match costs are relatively low,
and 100% Bag-Match is only marginally more effective than 5% Bag-Match. In the
final paragraph of Section 1.4, we explained how the dynamic model introduces an
implicit 0%/100% PPBM comparison into the 0%/5% PPBM comparison equation.
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In order to understand why this occurs, remember the scenario given in that section:
a successful terrorist attack occurs under 5% Bag-Match at time "t5 ." It could well
have occured earlier, at time "to = t5 - x; x > 0" had 0% Bag-Match been in opera-
tion, and if so, under the dynamic model, the FAA would require a switch to 100%
Bag-Match at that earlier stage. From time t5 to time t5 - x, we would have 100%
Bag-Match in operation had we started with 0% Bag-Match, and we would have 5%
Bag-Match in operation had we started with 5% Bag-Match. For this reason, under
the dynamic model we have an implicit 100%/5% Bag-Match comparison included in
our comparison of 0% and 5% Bag-Match.
For the above scenario, [M, L, L, M, HI, under the static model 100% Bag-Match
is much less cost-effective (expected aggregate yearly cost, including incident-related
costs, of $270 million) than either 5% Bag-Match ($176 million) or 0% Bag-Match
($140 million), while 5% Bag-Match is competitive with 0% Bag-Match. The inclusion
of the implicit 0%/100% PPBM comparison into the dynamic model's 0%/5% PPBM
comparison equation puts 0% PPBM at a disadvantage, due to the inferiority of 100%
PPBM for this scenario; for this reason, 5% PPBM becomes the optimal policy as we
move from the static to dynamic models. In general, for this static/dynamic model
"inconsistency" to occur, 100% PPBM must be dominated by 5% PPBM under the
static model. From 5% PPBM's substantial improvement under the dynamic model,
we would expect 5% PPBM to have beaten 100% PPBM quite often under the static
model. Otherwise, 5% PPBM would not make up much ground on 0% PPBM as
we move to the dynamic model. Indeed, under the static model, 100% Bag-Match is
dominated by 5% Bag-Match in 82.3% of the scenarios, which does much to explain
5% Bag-Match's improvement under the dynamic model.
For scenarios from this set, 5% Bag-Match tends to be more effective (AVG(k5) =
-0.79), incident-related costs tend to be lower (AVG(C) = -0.44), and the terrorist
risk tends to be lower (AVG(A) = -0.28).
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Results Summary
In this section, we have examined the overall performance of each of the three Bag-
Match policies under the static and dynamic models. We have observed relationships
that make intuitive sense: the partial and full Bag-Match implementations are often
favored when incidents are frequent and costly, and when Bag-Match is effective.
However, it was not obvious, a priori, which policies would be optimal under each
model for a given scenario without computations based on these models. For 100%
Bag-Match to be optimal, we found that it is all but necessary that incident costs
be extremely high - in only two scenarios was 100% Bag-Match optimal without this
being true. When 0% PPBM was optimal under both models, for no scenario was
it also true that 5% PPBM was highly effective. However, when 0% Bag-Match
was optimal for the static model and 5% Bag-Match was optimal for the dynamic
model, it was very often the case that 5% Bag-Match was highly effective. As for
overall performance, the 0% PPBM strategy was optimal for a sizeable portion of
the scenarios when we assumed that there would be no PPBM policy switch in the
wake of a successful attack. When we assumed a policy switch to 100% PPBM, 0%
and 5% Bag-Match were optimal in a comparable number of scenarios. Under both
assumptions, 100% Bag-Match was optimal in just a seventh of the scenarios.
1.8 Caveats
In this thesis, we are working with approximate models and imprecise estimates about
the parameters of these models. We based our estimates of A on the historical rate
of successful terrorist attacks via checked luggage on US domestic aviation and on
civil aviation outside of the US domestic sphere. First, the degree to which the future
will resemble the past, with regard to A, is unknown. For example, future US foreign
policy actions might lead to an increase or decrease in the magnitude of the terrorist
threat to US domestic aviation. Or perhaps terrorists will obtain or develop less-
detectable explosive devices, making an attack on civil aviation a more attractive
option to them. Second, it is plausible that the rate of future successful terrorist
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attacks via checked luggage is substantially different for US domestic flights than it is
for international or foreign domestic flights, yet we used the historical rate of terrorist
attacks on flights that are not US domestic as the basis for one of our estimates for
A Thus, it would be misleading to claim a high degree of accuracy surrounding our
estimate of A.
We have also assumed that successful terrorist attacks occur according to a fixed-
parameter Poisson Process, which, in turn, assumes that the probability of an event
occuring ill a given time interval is independent of what happens in prior intervals. If,
however, a successful terrorist attack were to encourage other attacks of the same sort,
this independence assumption would be violated. Furthermore, our model assumes
that the average annual risk of these terrorist attacks via checked baggage is fixed,
while, as we have mentioned, this risk might very well change over time. We do note
that one of the strengths of this analysis is that it suggests how the optimal PPBM
strategy should vary with the underlying degree of threat.
In estimating the dollar costs associated with deaths in luggage bombings, C, we
worked from the estimated cost of lawsuits and settlements for a single flight, Pan
Am 103. We were not able to locate figures on the total lawsuit-related costs for
the incident, and there was a scarcity of similar incidents for which such figures are
readily available, so we used what was available in making our estimates.
To estimate the loss of passenger revenue that would result from an incident, we
considered various successful attack scenarios, and assigned what we thought were
plausible values for the percentage of 1997 annual US carrier domestic revenue that
might be lost in these scenarios. These percentages were not based on a systematic
study or on historical data, so their accuracy is more suspect than that of some of
the other parameters we estimated. If it had been the case that revenue loss from
terrorist attacks was readily estimated, or if accurate figures of this loss were available,
we would not have relied as much on "percentage of annual revenue loss" estimates.
More generally, it is difficult to predict what the fatality levels in successful, future
luggage-bomb attacks might be, and the extent to which such attacks will frighten
people away from air travel. If we consider the aforementioned 1995 Ramzi Ahined
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Yousef plot to place bombs on twelve US passenger airliners, we might imagine that,
had his plot been even partially successful, the costs would have far exceeded our
high estimate for C.
We based our estimates of the annual costs of implementing a PPBM policy on
the results from [4], but, as the authors themselves mention, their cost estimates have
the following limitations:
(1) The PPBM Live-Test involved just 4% of flights, rather than a system-wide
implementation, and inefficiencies that might be present at the outset of PPBM oper-
ation might not persist with the same severity in the long-term. Due to circumstances
such as these, Barnett et al. were forced to extrapolate what the effects from a long-
term, system-wide PPBM implementation might be.
(2) The air carriers decided to suspend the Live Test when severe weather problems
disrupted operations, so as not to aggravate already difficult situations.
(3) Barnett et al. projected the ongoing costs of 5% PPBM via reverse-engineering
of the 100% PPBM results, and, as they mentioned, "it is unclear how much easier
and cheaper it is to focus on a small minority of passengers rather than all."
Each of these statements points to a source of inaccuracy in NEXTOR's estimates
for the yearly annual PPBM costs. However, as these estimates are the results of a
thorough experiment which involved an actual implementation of PPBM, we have
much more confidence in their accuracy than we do in that of our estimates of, say,
C.
We also made estimates for the probabilities that 5% and 100% Bag-Match will
prevent a terrorist attack. These estimates are highly speculative, by nature, as we are
estimating the likelihood that a PPBM strategy will forestall a future terrorist attack.
To reflect this uncertainty, we gave widely-ranging estimates for these parameters:
we allowed k5 to range from 0.25 to 0.875, and loo0 to range from 0.125 to 0.875.
The spreads of these estimates allow us to consider possibilities ranging from near-
uselessness to high effectiveness for the two PPBM policies, and we feel that it is
unlikely that k5 and lyoo values outside of these ranges would be possible. We concede
that a tighter, but more accurate, range might be preferable, but we were not able to
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provide such a range with much confidence.
Finally, we ask ourselves the question: "Is long-term expected cost the appropriate
criterion for choosing a Bag-Match strategy?" Long-term expected cost is of obvious
import to the US carriers which would have the responsibility of implementing a
Bag-Match policy and would suffer the financial consequences of terrorist attacks.
US carriers will have more interest in, and perhaps push for, implementing a safety
policy that they see as financially viable or even money-saving. The FAA, like any
policy-setting body, must be concerned with the extent and nature of the effects a
policy change might have, as well as with the constituents that will be affected. For
these reasons, the long-term expected cost of a PPBM policy decision is of interest
to both the FAA and the US airlines. However, this cost is just one measure, albeit
important, of the impact a policy will have on the aviation system. One might argue
for the inclusion of measures that are more difficult to quantify, such as "passenger
peace of mind," as an additional criterion. Passengers might very well be willing to
pay a small ticket surcharge to reduce the risk of successful terrorist acts, even if that
risk is quite small. This possibility is not considered in the cost-effectiveness model.
We concede that our analysis of PPBM has been based on a single criterion,
long-term expected cost, that might exclude other important considerations, but we
maintain that this criterion is of great interest to both the FAA and the US carriers.
We would encourage attempts at examining other consequences of PPBM policy
changes, such as an increase in "passenger peace of mind," that we did not cover in
this thesis.
The imperfections of this analysis compromise its results to an unknown extent.
That said, this study does provide a comparison of the long-term expected costs
that various PPBM strategies might involve, under a variety of assumptions. More
specifically, it gives some indication of the kinds of assumptions one has to make
to proclaim a particular policy superior to alternatives. In addition, our analysis
gives the reader the option of undertaking her own analysis of these issues, based
on different parameter estimates. Despite its imperfections, our work does provide a
quantitative analysis of a pressing civil aviation policy issue, the implementation of
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PPBM, where there had been limited prior research.
1.9 Summary and Conclusions
In this thesis, we have worked on an optimization problem that was implicitly posed
by the FAA: "Under which conditions are each of no Bag-Match (hereafter, 0% PPB-
M), 5% Bag-Match with passenger profiling, and 100% Bag-Match, optimal for US
domestic flights?" The FAA expressed a strong preference for 5% Bag-Match, but we
decided to approach this optimality question ourselves, from an analytic perspective.
We used probabilistic modeling to describe the process by which successful ter-
rorist attacks, via checked luggage, might occur on US domestic flights. We reasoned
that, in the wake of a successful attack, the FAA could either recommend a switch
to full PPBM implementation or leave in place the PPBM policy that had been in
operation at the time of the attack. We developed models for each possibility, and
derived equations in order to compare the long-term expected cost of the three Bag-
Match options: no implementation of PPBM, 5% PPBM with passenger profiling,
and 100% PPBM. Using highly approximate methods, we arrived at low, middle, and
high estimates for each of the models' parameters. To do so, we considered how often
we might expect successful terrorist attacks in the future, absent PPBM, and also
how much success 5% and 100% PPBM would have in preventing these attacks. We
also considered how expensive 5% and 100% PPBM might be to implement, and how
expensive successful terrorist attacks would be. We enumerated what we considered a
set of plausible scenarios, and examined the performance of the three PPBM policies
over the full set of cases, both under the assumption that, after an incident, the FAA
would recommend a switch to 100% PPBM (the "dynamic" assumption) and under
the assumption that it would leave the previous PPBM policy in place (the "static"
assumption).
Under the "static" assumption, our assessment indicated that the policy of not
implementing PPBM at all was most "cost-effective" (i.e. optimal) for a greater
proportion of the scenarios than was either of the two Bag-Match alternatives. In
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particular, we found that not implementing Bag-Match at all would be the optimal
decision under the static model in 69.5% of the scenarios, 5% Bag-Match would be
optimal in 16.5% of the scenarios, and 100% Bag-Match, in 14.0% of the cases. From
these results, one might conclude that if the "static" assumption holds true, money
might be better spent on other hazards to air travelers than on a partial or full
Bag-Match implementation.
Under the "dynamic" assumption, our analysis indicated that 0% PPBM was most
cost-effective in 44.4% of the scenarios, that 5% PPBM was the most cost-effective
in 41.6% of the scenarios, and that 100% PPBM was again the optimal policy in
just 14.0% of the cases. We noted the substantial improvement in performance of
5% Bag-Match under this assumption, looked at a scenario under which 5% Bag-
Match became optimal as we moved from the static to the dynamic assumption, and
gave reasons for this improvement. From these results, if the dynamic assumption
proves to be realistic, policy makers might be best off recommending either no PPBM
implementation at all, or a 5% PPBM implementation.
Under each assumption, a full-implementation of PPBM does "win" under a limit-
ed set of circumstances: in general, when 100% PPBM provides much added security
over 5% PPBM, and when terrorist attacks are frequent and highly costly. 5% PPB-
M is optimal under each assumption in a majority of cases in which annual PPBM
costs are low, 5% Bag-Match is highly effective, and incident-related costs are high.
These sets of circumstances comprise a substantial portion of the scenario set, and it
very well might be the case that a "100% PPBM-friendly" or "5% PPBM-friendly"
scenario most accurately represents the present and future reality. To dismiss either
100% or 5% Bag-Match as an inferior policy due to these results would be foolish.
We stress that our analysis has its limitations, but that our results suggest that
the FAA-re n1mmend1d 5% FFBM policy is not neosgsarily too lam or too 9tringant.
Each of the three levels of Bag-Match implementation (or non-implementation, as
the case may be) was optimal for a substantial subset of the scenarios we considered.
As we have seen, the optimality of a Bag-Match policy depends on the magnitude
of the terrorist threat and the effectiveness of Bag-Match in counteracting it. Any
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improvements in assessing these factors would allow for more accurate modeling and
more reliable decision-making.
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Appendix A
Relevant Acts of Terrorism
Successful Acts of Terrorist Agression via Checked Luggage from 1950 to
1999
1955, November 1. United Air Lines flight #629 , from Denver to Seattle. 44/44
dead. "11 minutes after takeoff an explosion disintegrated the aircraft in flight. A
dynamite bomb detonated in No. 4 baggage compartment. 39 Passengers; 5 crew. J.
Graham executed for the crime." [9]
1972, January 26. Jugoslovenski Aero-transport (Yugoslavia) flight #364, over
Ceske Kamenice, Czechoslovakia. 27/28 dead. "Homemade bomb in forward lug-
gage compartment. Aircraft crashed; 28 persons aboard. (Note: Sole survivor fell
approximately 15,000 feet in tail section.)" [9]
1976, January 1. Middle East Airlines (Lebanon) flight #438, between Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. 82/82 dead. "The jetliner crashed into the Arabian desert after
an explosion aboard the aircraft caused a high order explosion in forward baggage
compartment." [9]
1981, August 31. Middle East Airlines (Lebanon), on the ground at Beirut. 2
killed.[5] "Explosion estimated at 5 kilograms of dynamite severely damaged the
empty aircraft. Explosion occurred shortly after the aircraft completed a flight from
Libya." [9]
'Flight numbers were taken from [5] in most cases
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1983, September 23. Gulf Air (Bahrain) flight #771, 30 miles from Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates. 112/112 dead. "Bomb exploded in the baggage compartment.
The aircraft crashed in the desert while preparing to land." [9]
1985, June 23. Air India flight #182, about 90 miles off the coast of Ireland.
329/329 dead. "As the aircraft neared Ireland, it disappeared from the radar screen
and crashed in the ocean. After examining the wreckage, scientists reported [sic]
a powerful explosion occurred in the front cargo hold." [9] "Terrorist working in
Vancouver, Canada, checked baggage with bombs on two flights. One bag transferred
at Toronto onto flight 182," [5]
1988, December 21. Pan Anr flight #103, over Lockerbie, Scotland. 259/259
passengers dead. 11 killed on ground. "The airliner disappeared from radar shortly
after leveling off at FL 310 while on a flight from Heathrow Airport, London, to New
York ... Detonation of an explosive device in the forward cargo area." [5] "Located
in baggage compartment." [9]
1989, September 19. Union des Transportes Aeriens (France) flight #772, near
Niger. 171/171 dead. "While climbing through FL 350 ft., 46 minutes after takeoff,
a bomb exploded in a container in location 13-R in the forward cargo hold ... A Con-
golese man, who boarded at Brazzaville and disembarked at Ndjamera was believed
to have brought the bomb aboard." [5]
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